Leadership in Practice: the Columbia Accident Essay

IntroductionFor this paper, I pick up chosen to analyze the lead surgical process of Linda ham, Chair of Mission precaution Team, and Daniel S. Goldin, NASA Administrator, 19922001. Both, in my estimation, were realm of the problem, and not part of the solution. Both succumbed to outside political forces and placed much to a greater extent tenseness on meeting self-imposed deadlines than astronaut asylum. Both gradually disregard the vast majority of the recommendations of the Rogers Com electric charge after the loss of the Challenger and blamed NASA to repeat history.Background of leader 1Linda Ham, Chair of the Mission focal point team up for the last capital of South Carolina mission, was hired by the National aeronautics and lay Administration (NASA) soon after she graduated college. She began her c areer with NASA as a Propulsion Systems Monitor at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space effect in Houston, Texas. Over the years she rose through the ranks of NASA to Chair the Mission solicitude team for STS-107, which was the failed mission of the Space boo Columbia that broke up upon re-entry into the earths atmosphere.Background of leader 2Daniel S. Goldin, NASA Administrator, 19922001, was hired by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) soon after he graduated college. He began his career at NASAs Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio works in electric propulsion systems for human interplanetary travel. He left NASA a few years later and began working for the TRW Space and Technology Group. Over his 25 year career at TRW, Goldin rose through the ranks to become the Vice President and General managing director of TRW. Goldin whence returned to NASA and became its longest tenured Administrator. Goldin was known for being able to carving costs and still provide many situation programs.His crusade for faculty (2004) ended up being the most visible flaw in an administration philosophy that lost an different seven astronauts. An other glance into what kind of man and leader Daniel S. Goldin is, crowd out be imbed in a lawsuit by the Department of Justice that that seeks more than $one hundred seventy million from TRW Inc., which is accused of padding g all overnment space contracts with research-and-development costs that should deal been paid out of TRWs profits. The lawsuit contends that Daniel S. Goldin, who ran the companys Space & Technology Group during the early 1990s, participated in the alleged overcharges by authorizing wary accounting practices. (1998)Leadership behaviorsBoth Goldin and Ham clearly pushed the NASA agenda which was mint by Goldin. Both appear to fit into the despotical leadership style in that they demanded absolute obedience. Neither fostered a culture where diverse thought process was welcome. Both created an atmosphere where diverse or dissenting opinion was treat and unwelcome. Goldin and Ham forced many NASA employees, specifically engineers and caoutchouc personne l, to become brass instrumental bystanders (2008) because they were unwilling to adventure their career to challenge the agenda of Goldin and Ham. NASA became a work with administrative blinders on. NASA is not functioning as a learning organization (Gehman, 2003). NASA mission managers were convinced, without study, that nothing could be done about such an emergency.The gifted curiosity and skepticism that a solid safety culture requires was closely undefiledly absent. Shuttle managers did not embrace safety-conscious attitudes. Instead, their attitudes were shaped and reinforced by an organization that, in this instance, was incapable of stepping back and gauging its biases. Bureaucracy and process trumped thoroughness and mind (Gehman, 2003). Hams influence on STS-107 is most clearly exposit in this excerpt from the Case Study on the Columbia calamity by Maureen Hogan Casamayou, George Mason University, Fairfax, VirginiaHam did inquire about the foam strike, and not to determine what action to take during Columbias mission, provided to understand the implications for STS-114. During a Mission Management Team meeting on January 21, she asked about the rationale put forward at the STS-113 Flight manners review passed essentialer not because of their inherent validity (and hence greater safety for the crew) but simply to launch another move into space on account. As the CAIB report states, Hams focus on examining the rationale for continuing to fly after foam problems with STS-87 and STS-112 indicates that her attention had already shifted from the threat of the foam posed to STS-107 to the downstream implications of the foam strike. Ham was repayable to serve . . . as the launch integration manager for the next mission, STS-114. If the Shuttle Programs rationale to fly with foam loss was found to be flawed, the flight, due to be launched in about a month, would have to be delayed per NASA rules that require serious problems to be resolved in front the next flight.An STS-114 delay could in turn delay completion of the internationalistic Space Stations Node 2, which was a high precedence goal for NASA managers. Further evidence of her preoccupation with meeting the designated launch schedule was reflected in Hams business concern about the length of conviction to process photos of the Columbia on-orbit. According to the CAIB, on January 23rd Ham brocaded concerns that the extra time spent maneuvering Columbia to make the left reference visible for imaging would unduly impact the mission schedule for example, comprehension experiments would have to stop while imagery was taken. According to personal notes obtained by the Board Linda Ham said it was no longer being move since even if we saw something, we couldnt do anything about it. The Program didnt want to spend the resources. (CAIBR 2003)Further evidence of the unchallenged assumptions and lack of skilful curiosity at NASA is described by Niewoehner & Steidle, At the January 24, Mission Management Team meeting at which the no safety-of-flight conclusion was presented, there was minuscular engineering discussion about the assumptions made, and how the results would differ if other assumptions were used. Engineering solutions presented to caution should have included a quantifiable range of uncertainty and risk analysis. Those types of tools were readily available, routinely used, and would have helped management understand the risk gnarled in the decision. Management, in turn, should have demanded such information. The very absence of a clear and open discussion of uncertainties and assumptions in the analysis presented should have caused management to probe further. (2009) A different outcomeIn reviewing this case study, I am nearly certain that leadership style played a secondary role in the situation. The primary issue appears to be that the leaders, Goldin and Ham to be specific, allowed the outside influence of budgetary constraint s imposed by sex act and the Presidential Administration to shape their mission and great deal for NASA. In unimaginative terms, the amount of money in the budget and the self-imposed goals of the number of shuttle missions to keep that budget from decreasing over-road concern for safety. Not only did it over-ride that concern for safety, but it created an organizational culture that ignored any line of thought that challenged or threatened NASAs goals. We must remember that there are drawbacks in stating specific identified government organizational goals.When a government, or a component of government, forecasts where it wants to be in the hereafter, it binds itself to those identified goals. Administrators become personally attached or emotionally involved and are loath to depart for fear of appearing to admit failure. This certainly affected the leadership and insurance decisions of Goldin and Ham. Rocha could have done more to bring the safety concerns to light, however in retrospect, he clearly would have risked his career in doing so. We need more leaders, and followers, who are willing to risk their career especially when human vitality is at stake. A different outcome for STS-107 is very likely if NASA had authentically functioned as a High Reliability Organization, which Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) say is characterized byA preoccupation with failureReluctance to simplify interpretationsSensitivity to operationsCommitment to resilienceDeference to expertiseGoldin and Ham could have employ the louver key dimensions of collaboration governance, administration, organizational autonomy, mutuality, and norms of trust and reciprocity. They could have created a team or committee to review, research, and assess each and every safety concern that was raised by any NASA employee. This team should have negotiated, committed, and then implemented those commitments. There was no trust and reciprocity between the NASA engineers and the NASA mission manage rs. Goldin and Ham should have embraced a more Democratic Leadership Style. Although a Democratic leader will make the final decision, he/she invites other members of the team to contribute to the decision making process.This not only increases lineage satisfaction by involving employees or team members in whats red ink on, but it also help to develop peoples skills. Employees and team members feel in control of their own destiny, such as the procession they deserve and so are motivated to work hard by more than just a financial reward. As participation takes time, this show up can lead to things happening more slowly but a good deal the end result is better. The approach can be most equal where team work is essential and quality is more important than upper to market productivity. (2012)Yes, they would have likely missed future deadlines, probably scratched future missions, and maybe even lost some of NASAs precious keep from Congress, but the strengths of the five key dime nsions were never given a come about to prevail. The reason why is glaringly clear The most costly resources of collaboration are not money but time and energy, neither of which can be induced. Huxham (1996) With NASAs entire function hinging on budgetary concerns that became exact deadlines, time trumped safety and everyone from Congress and the Presidential administration to NASA management and the entire workforce, all have blood on their hands.My outlookAs a future leader, I am most profoundly struck by the impact of bureaucracy. I believe that even Goldin and Ham would have changed their decisions had they had the take in of hindsight and knew that seven astronauts would lose their lives because of their lack of leadership, management, and administrative capabilities. We must listen to election viewpoints and encourage open dialogue as future government leaders. We must strive for objectivity in our perspective and not allow our vision to be narrowed by clinging too tightly to a construct or idea that was good in another setting. If human safety is in any way a factor, our level of scrutiny in gathering facts for decision making must be to the utmost. My biggest take-away from this identification is learning the definition of a high reliableness organization and the five bullets that must be embraced to be a true high reliability organization. I will take this concept with me for the rest of my career.Roberts, A. (2004). The elucidate bubble bursts. Public Administration Review,64(5), 625-629. Retrieved from http//search.proquest.com/docview/197172592?accountid=27965 By, A. P. (1998, Feb 20). Civil fraud lawsuit against TRW inc. over space contracts is joined by U.S. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http//search.proquest.com/docview/398647798?accountid=27965 Marc, S. G., & Robert, B. S. (2008). Organizational bystanders. mess and Strategy, 31(1), 47-54. Retrieved from http//search.proquest.com/docview/224596278?accountid=27965 Gehman, H.W. et. a l., Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report Volume 1 (CAIB) (August 2003).Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report (Washington D.C. Government Printing Office, control First Printing, August 2003)Robert, J. N., & Craig, E. S. (2009). The loss of the space shuttle Columbia Portaging leadership lessons with a critical thinking model. Engineering Management Journal, 21(1), 9-18. Retrieved from http//search.proquest.com/docview/208970180?accountid=27965 Weick, K., & Sutcliffe, K. (2001). Managing the Unexpected. San Francisco Jossey-Bass Bhatti, N., Ghulam, M. M., Shaikh, N., Muhammad, A. H., & Faiz, M. S. (2012). The impact of autocratic and democratic leadership style on job satisfaction. International moving in Research, 5(2), 192-201. 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